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Abstract: This paper measures the degree of market power of the Greek food and beverages 
manufacturing industry over the period 1983–2007 at the three-digit SIC level. The present 
study also estimates the “deadweight” loss and the reduction of consumers’ income due to the 
possible existence of market power in the Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry. 
Based on Bresnahan’s (1989) conjectural variation model, three different approaches are used 
to investigate competitive conditions of the Greek food and beverages manufacturing 
industry. The first approach assesses the extent of market power of the whole industry over 
the period 1983–2007; the second approach tests the degree of market power in each one of 
the nine sectors of the industry over the whole period, i.e. 1983–2007; and the third one 
estimates the extent of market power for the whole Greek food and beverages manufacturing 
industry for specific sub-periods of the period 1983–2007. The methodology of Dickson and 
Yu (1989) is adopted to measure the welfare losses. The empirical results indicate the 
presence of some degree of market power in the whole Greek food and beverages 
manufacturing industry as well as in each one sector of the industry during the period 1983–
2007 and, as a result, the existence of welfare losses. In addition, the empirical findings 
support the presence of some degree of market power for each sub-period of the period 1983–
2007 in the whole Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry and the existence of 
welfare losses. 
Keywords: Conjectural variation, Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry, Market 
power; Welfare losses 
JEL classification: D43, D60, L66, Q10 
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1.  Introduction 
  The food and beverages manufacturing industry has a very important role in the Greek 
manufacturing industry and generally in the Greek economy. According to the Hellenic 
Federation and Enterprises (SEV) and the Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research 
(IOBE), this sector has the highest contribution in all of the basic economic magnitudes of 
manufacturing pertaining to employment, value added and sales. In particular, IOBE in its 
2010 annual report for the Greek manufacturing industry mentions that the Greek food and 
beverages manufacturing industry creates about 120,000 jobs which account for about 22% of 
total employees in manufacturing and holds about 21% of the total sales of the manufacturing 
industry. Also, the food and beverages manufacturing industry holds the highest share of the 
total value added which equals about 24% of the total value added.  
  The present study is based on the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) 
approach to measure the degree of market power of the Greek food and beverages 
manufacturing industry and estimate the “deadweight” loss and the reduction of consumers’ 
income due to the possible existence of imperfect competition. 
  There is an international growing literature of NEIO studies that measures and tests for 
the degree of market power in the food and beverages manufacturing industry. In particular, a 
list of the studies using the NEIO approach to investigate competitive conditions in the food 
and beverages manufacturing industry around the world are the studies by Buyan and Lopez 
(1997) for food and tobacco products in the U.S.; Lopez, Azzam and Liron-Espana (2002) for 
the food sector in the U.S.; Hatirli, Ozkan, Jones and Aktas (2006) for the milk sub-sector in 
Turkey and Anders (2008) for food retailing in Germany. There is, however, a lack of recent 
research which measures the degree of market power in the Greek food and beverages 
manufacturing industry. The only study which investigates competitive conditions in the 
Greek manufacturing industry and more specifically in the Greek food and beverages 
manufacturing industry is that undertaken by Bourlakis (1992b). Also of great importance is 
the evaluation of welfare losses due to imperfect competition after the Harberger’s (1954) first 
and seminal study. More recently, Peterson and Connor (1995) and Bhuyan and Lopez (1997) 
have estimated the welfare losses in the U.S. food and tobacco manufacturing industries. 
  In this paper, the conjectural variation approach (Bresnahan, 1982) is applied to 
empirically investigate the degree of market power in the Greek food and beverages 
manufacturing industry. In particular, three different approaches are used. The first approach 
assesses the extent of the market power of the whole Greek food and beverages 
manufacturing industry over the period 1983–2007, the second approach tests the degree of 
market power in each one of the nine sectors of the industry over the period under 
consideration, i.e. 1983–2007, and the third approach estimates the extent of market power for 
the whole industry for specific sub-periods of the period 1983–2007. In addition, the present 
study adopts the methodology of Dickson and Yu (1989) to estimate: 1) the net loss of 
welfare (this loss of welfare is the so-called “deadweight” loss or Harberger loss) due to the 
existence of oligopoly (Harberger, 1954), 2) the reduction of consumers’ welfare due to the 
transfer of income from consumers to the monopolist (this reduction is known as the Tullock 
loss) in the case of oligopoly power (Tullock, 1967). 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
methodology of the model used and Section 3 presents its specification and data variables. In 
Section 4 the results are analyzed, while Section 5 presents the conclusions of the study.  
 
2.  Methodology 
The approach used in this paper in order to investigate the degree of market power in the 
Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry is developed by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau 
(1982), as expanded by Bresnahan (1989). Following Bresnahan’s (1989) conjectural   3
variation model of competition, a manufacturing industry is considered in which firms face a 
demand function  () , pp Y z ≡ , with  i
i
Yy =∑ , and  1,..., in =  where  p  is the output price, i y  
represents the quantity supplied by firm i, n is the number of firms and z  is a vector of 
exogenous factors affecting the demand curve. Thus, the profit maximization problem of firm 
i is given as: 
() ( ) max , , ii i i pYz y Cyw π =⋅ −                                                                                      (1) 
where  () , ii Cyw is the cost function of firm i and  i w  is a vector of input prices of firm i. 
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where  i MC  is the marginal cost of firm i,  ( ) ( ) 0 hY p Y p ≡ ∂∂ < is the price elasticity of 
output demand and  () () ii i Yy Y y θ ≡∂ ∂  is the conjectural variation elasticity of firm i 
which  represents the reaction of total industry to the change of output of firm i and it is a 
measure of competition. When  i θ  takes the value of zero for all firms, then the industry is 
under conditions of perfect competition, while the value of one indicates a monopolistic 
market. Values of  i θ  between zero and one support the presence of Cournot oligopoly in the 
food and beverages manufacturing industry.  
According to Bresnahan (1989), multiplying equation (3) by ii y C , summing over i and 
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where  y S  is the ratio of aggregate revenue to total cost, MC  is the industry-level (weighted) 






1 According to Cowling and Waterson (1976), the average 
degree of competition parameter  f   ( ) 01 with f ≤ ≤  measures the average deviation  of 
firms’ behavior from the monopolistic case and, if properly identified in the estimation 
process, expresses the true degree of market power exerted by firms, with 1 f =  indicating 
monopolistic market power, 0 1 f <<  Cournot oligopoly, and  0 f =  perfect competition. 
Furthermore, a specified cost function, i.e.  ( ) , ii Cyw and a cost share equation for labor are 
added to the empirical system in order to improve the precision of the estimates. 
Following the methodology of Dickson and Yu (1989), the industry demand curve is 
represented by  1
h Yp = , where  h  is the absolute value of the demand elasticity, h. In 
addition, the weighted industry marginal cost curve ( ) MC  is presented by YM C
ε
= , where ε 
is the inverse of the weighted industry marginal cost elasticity. Based on the Lerner 
                                                 
1  Lf h =− , where L  is the Lerner index which is the relative mark-up or the price-cost margin.   4
index, () oo Lp M C pf h =− = , the oligopoly price ( ) o p  and the oligopoly output () o Y are 
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The net loss of welfare (deadweight loss or Harberger loss) due to the existence of oligopoly 







WL Y Y dY
ε ⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦ ∫                                                                                             (7) 
The reduction of consumers’ welfare due to the transfer of income from consumers to the 
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3. Model Formulation and Data Variables 
The translog specification for the total cost function with two inputs, one output and 
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where Ct represents the industry-level cost, Wl,t, Wk,t correspond to the two input prices, i.e. 
labor and capital respectively; Yt corresponds to the output quantity of industry; T is the time 
trend. The convention for the translog function is followed by letting variables with upper 
bars, i.e. input prices and output, be normalized by their means to avoid possible multi-
colinearity. 
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where h is the industry demand elasticity,  t p is the output price,  t b is a price deflator,  t I  is the 
Gross National Product, POPt is the population of Greece, z159 is the income demand 
elasticity of sector 159 where sector 159 is the manufacture of beverages as referred to Table 
1 and DSs (s=151,…,158) is a dummy variable, which is set to one for the s sector and zero 
otherwise in order to account for possible differences in the income demand elasticity among 
the sectors of the food and beverages manufacturing industry. Note that the s sectors are 
defined in Table 1. Furthermore, zs (s=151,…,158) refers to the change in the income demand 
elasticity of s sector (s=151,…,158) with respect to the sector 159, i.e. the manufacture of 
beverages. 
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Note that since the sum of the dependent variables over the two cost share equations (11) and 
(12) always equals 1 then only one factor share equation is linearly independent. As a result, it 
is necessary to omit one equation (equation for capital) to avoid singularity of the estimated 
covariance matrix.  
Three different approaches are used in the present study to investigate competitive 
conditions in the Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry. The first approach is 
based on the estimated system of equations (9), (10), (11) and the following supply function 
(13) where a unique estimate of the degree of market power ( ) 15 f  is obtained for the whole 
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where  , Yt S  is the ratio of the industry’s aggregate revenue to total cost and  15 f  is the 
conjectural variation elasticity for the whole food and beverages manufacturing industry. 
The second approach investigates two related estimated equation systems. The first 
estimated system includes the equations (9), (10), (11) and the following supply function (14) 
where the f parameter is allowed to change among the sectors of the food and beverages 
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where  159 f  is the conjectural variation elasticity of sector 159, i.e. the manufacture of 
beverages and s f () 151,...,158 s =  refers to the change in the conjectural variation elasticity of 
ssector  () 151,...,158 s =  with respect to sector 159. In addition, s DS   () 151,...,158 s =  is a 
dummy variable, which is set to one for the s sector and zero otherwise (Table 1). The 
empirical results of the aforementioned estimated system, provided in the next section, 
indicate that all of the sectors have the same conjectural variation elasticity, f, except that of 
sector 157, i.e. manufacture of prepared animal feeds. Thus, the supply function (14) is re-
specified and a slightly modified system (second estimated system) is estimated under the 
second approach. More analytically, the second estimated system of the second approach 
contains the equations (9), (10), (11) and the following supply function (15) where the 
estimate of the degree of market power ( ) 16 f  is the same for all sectors of the food and 
beverages manufacturing industry except that of sector 157 (manufacture of prepared animal 
feeds ):   
()
, 16 157
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where 16 f  refers to the conjectural variation elasticity which is the same across all sectors of 
the Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry except that of sector 157,  157 f  is the 
change in the conjectural variation elasticity of the sector 157 with respect to the other sectors 
of manufacturing, i.e. 16 f , and  157 DS  is the dummy variable corresponding to sector 157.    6
The third approach is based on the estimated system of equations (9), (10), (11) and the 
following supply function (16) which allows f to change for each sub-period of the period 
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where 1 f  refers to the conjectural variation elasticity of the sub-period t=1, i.e. the years 
1983–1985, and  t DT () 2,...,8 t =  is a dummy variable, which is set to one for the sub-period t 
and zero otherwise.
2 Note also that  t f   ( ) 2,...,8 t =  refers to the change of the conjectural 
variation elasticity of sub-period t () 2,...,8 t =  with respect to the sub-period  1 t = , i.e. 1983–
1985. 
The sample comprised annual data for the period 1983–2007 for nine sectors at the 
three-digit SIC level of the Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry, i.e. SIC: 151-
159, based on the Statistical Nomenclature of Economic Activity of 2003 (STAKOD_2003). 
The data used in the estimation was obtained by the Annual National Industrial Survey of the 
Hellenic Statistical Authority (EL.STAT.) The nine sectors of the Greek food and beverages 
manufacturing industry are presented in Table 1.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
The empirical results of the three different approaches used to measure the degree of 
market power in the Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry are presented in Table 
2. The equation systems of the three different approaches are estimated using the non-linear 
three-stage least square (NL3SLS) estimation technique. The econometric analysis is 
conducted using Shazam 9.0 software. 
The empirical findings of the three different approaches are plausible and consistent 
with economic theory in terms of the signs and the magnitudes of the coefficients and indicate 
that the translog cost function satisfies the restrictions of monotonicity and concavity at the 
sample mean (Table 2).
3 According to the first approach, the empirical results indicate that all 
the estimated coefficients of the translog cost function are statistically significant at any 
conventional level of significance (Table 2, First Approach). Furthermore, the results support 
that the cost shares of labor () 0.7779 l a =  and capital ( ) 0.2222 k a = are statistically 
significant at any conventional level of significance. These labor and capital share estimates 
are similar to the corresponding mean labor and capital cost shares calculated from the data, 
i.e. 0.7071 and 0.2929 respectively. The results of the supply function reveal that the 
conjectural variation elasticity () 15 0.7104 f =  is statistically significant at any conventional 
level of significance and its value is ranged between zero and one. These results imply the 
presence of some degree of market power in the Greek food and beverages manufacturing 
industry over the period 1983–2007. The estimated results of the demand function indicate 
that first, the price elasticity of output demand ( ) -0.7130 h =  is statistically significant at any 
conventional level of significance; second, the income demand elasticity of sector 159 
                                                 
2  It is noted that the sub-period 2 (t=2) corresponds to the period 1986–1988, the sub-period 3 (t=3) to the 
period 1989–1991, the sub-period 4 (t=4) to the period 1992–1994, the sub-period 5 (t=5) to the period 1995–
1997, the sub-period 6 (t=6) to the period 1998–2000,  the sub-period 7 (t=7) to the period 2001–2003 and the 
sub-period 8 (t=8 ) to the period 2004–2007. 
3 The monotonicity restriction at the sample mean implies that al>0 and ak>0, while the concavity restriction 
implies that the Hessian matrix is negative semidefinite, i.e. all Allen-Uzawa own-partial elasticities of 
substitution are negative at the sample mean.   7
() 159 0.3969 z = , i.e. the manufacture of beverages, is statistically significant; and third the 
change of the income demand elasticity of each one of the sectors of the food and beverages 
manufacturing industry, s z () 151,...,158 s = , with respect to sector 159, i.e. the manufacture of 
beverages, is statistically significant at any conventional level of significance. Furthermore, 
the results regarding scale economies imply the presence of increasing returns to scale. 
Finally, relative to the whole Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry, the 
Harberger loss is about €96.53 million in terms of 2007 value added (or 2.74% of the 2007 
value added) whereas the Tullock loss is about €176.51 million in terms of 2007 value added 
(or 5.01% of the 2007 value added) (Table 3). 
The empirical findings of the first estimated system of the second approach show that 
most of the estimated parameters of the translog cost function are statistically significant at 
any conventional level of significance (Table 2, Second Approach, First Estimated System). 
In addition, the results support that the cost shares of labor ( ) 0.7706 l a =  and capital 
() 0.2294 k a = are statistically significant at any conventional level of significance. Moreover, 
the results of the supply function show that only sector 157, i.e. the manufacture of prepared 
animal feeds, has a statistically different degree of market power from sector 159, i.e. the 
manufacture of beverages, since only the change in the conjectural variation elasticity of 
sector 157() 157 f  with respect to sector 159 is statistically significant. These results are 
reinforced by the fact that the Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis which supports 
that all sectors, except sector 157, have the same degree of market power as that of sector 
159.
4 The estimated results of the demand function indicate that first, the price elasticity of 
output demand () -0.6782 h =  is statistically significant at any conventional level of 
significance; second, the income demand elasticity of sector 159 ( ) 159 0.4029 z = , i.e. the 
manufacture of beverages, is statistically significant; and third the change in the income 
demand elasticity of each one of the sectors of the food and beverages manufacturing 
industry, s z () 151,...,158 s = , with respect to sector 159, i.e. the manufacture of beverages, is 
statistically significant at any conventional level of significance. Furthermore, the results 
regarding scale economies imply the presence of increasing returns to scale. 
  According to the empirical results of the second estimated system of the second 
approach, all the estimated coefficients of the translog cost function are statistically 
significant at any conventional level of significance (Table 2, Second Approach, Second 
Estimated System). Furthermore, the results support that the cost shares of labor() 0.7782 l a =  
and capital () 0.2218 k a =  are statistically significant at any conventional level of 
significance. Moreover, the results of the supply function reveal that first, the conjectural 
variation elasticity of all the sectors except sector 157, i.e.  16 f , is statistically significant at 
any conventional level of significance; and second, the change of the conjectural variation 
elasticity of sector 157 () 157 0.0004 f =−  with respect to the conjectural variation elasticity of 
all the other sectors ( ) 16 0.7714 f =  is statistically significant at any conventional level of 
significance. Note that the conjectural variation elasticity of sector 157 is 
                                                 
4 Wald test: the null hypothesis is  151 152 153 154 155 156 158 0 fffffff = ======  whereas the 
alternative is that at least one of the aforementioned sectors is different from zero. The Wald test used follows 
the chi-squared ()
2 χ distribution with 7 degrees of freedom. The t-statistic and the p-value are 4.30 and 0.7452 
respectively. 
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0.7710() 16 157 0.7710 ff += . In addition, both conjectural variation elasticities of all sectors of 
the industry except sector 157() 16 0.7714 f =  and that of sector 157( ) 16 157 0.7710 ff += , i.e. 
sector 157 the manufacture of prepared animal feeds, are ranged between zero and one which 
indicates the presence of some degree of market power for each sector of the Greek food and 
beverages manufacturing industry over the period 1983–2007. 
The empirical results of the demand equation reveal that, first, the price elasticity of 
output demand () -0.7742 h =  is statistically significant at any conventional level of 
significance; second, the income demand elasticity of sector 159 ( ) 159 0.3701 z = , i.e. the 
manufacture of beverages, is statistically significant; and third the change in the income 
demand elasticity of each one of the sectors of the food and beverages manufacturing 
industry, s z () 151,...,158 s = , with respect to sector 159, i.e. the manufacture of beverages, is 
statistically significant at any conventional level of significance. Furthermore, the results 
regarding scale economies imply the presence of increasing returns to scale. Finally, the 
Harberger loss is about €1.47 million in terms of 2007 value added (or 2.43% of the 2007 
value added) for sector 157, i.e. the manufacture of prepared animal feeds, and €87.26 million 
(or 2.52% of the 2007 value added) for all other sectors, i.e. sectors 151–156 & 158–159, 
whereas the Tullock loss is about €2.58 million in terms of 2007 value added (or 4.25% of the 
2007 value added) for sector 157 and €151.31 million (or 4.37% of the 2007 value added) for 
all other sectors of the Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry, i.e. sectors 151–156 
& 158–159, (Table 3). 
  The empirical findings of the third approach (Table 2, Third Approach) show that all the 
estimated coefficients of the translog cost function are statistically significant at any 
conventional level of significance. In addition, the cost shares of labor() 0.7817 l a = and 
capital() 0.2183 k a =  are statistically significant at any conventional level of significance. 
Furthermore, the empirical findings of the supply function indicate that first, the conjectural 
variation elasticity () 1 f of the sub-period t=1, i.e. years 1983–1985, is statistically significant 
at any conventional level of significance and second, the change of the conjectural variation 
elasticity of each sub-period ( t f , ) 2,...,8 t =  with respect to the conjectural variation elasticity 
of the sub-period  1 t = , 1 f , is statistically significant.
5 Moreover, the empirical findings 
indicate that the conjectural variation elasticity of each sub-period is ranged between zero and 
one implying the presence of some degree of market power for each sub-period of the period 
1983–2007 for the whole Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry. Figure 1 depicts 
the degree of market power for the whole Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry 
for each sub-period of the period 1983–2007. According to Figure 1, the sub-period t=1, i.e. 
the years 1983–1985, presents the highest conjectural variation elasticity () 1 0.6612 f =  and as 
a result the highest degree of market power whereas the sub-period t=8, i.e. the years 2004–
2007, shows the lowest conjectural variation elasticity ( ) 18 0.6596 ff +=  and as a result the 
                                                 
5 More specific, the conjectural variation approach of the sub-period 1983–1985 is 0.6612 (f1=0.6612), of the 
sub-period 1986–1988 is 0.6609 (f1+f2=0.6609), of the sub-period 1989–1991 is 0.6605 (f1+f3=0.6605), of the 
sub-period 1992–1994 is 0.6603 (f1+f4=0.6603), of the sub-period 1995–1997 is 0.6600 (f1+f5=0.6600), of the 
sub-period 1998–2000 is 0.6598 (f1+f6=0.6598), of the sub-period 2001–2003 is 0.6600 (f1+f7=0.6600), of the 
sub-period 2004–2007 is 0.6596 (f1+f8=0.6596). 
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lowest degree of market power. In general, Figure 1 shows that the degree of market power 
gradually decreases during the sub-periods under consideration except that of the sub-period 
t=7, i.e. the years 2001–2003, where an increase in the degree of market power 
occurred() 17 0.6600 ff += . In particular, while the conjectural variation elasticity gradually 
decreases and takes the value of 0.6598 ( ) 16 0.6598 ff += for the sub-period t=6, i.e. the years 
1998–2000, it becomes slightly higher and takes the value of 0.6600 ( ) 17 0.6600 ff += for the 
sub-period t=7, i.e. the years 2001–2003. 
  Two important events took place which resulted in the gradual decrease in the degree of 
market power in the Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry during the period 
1983–2007 except that of the period 2001–2003, i.e. the sub-period t=1,…, 8 except that of 
t=7. The first event is the deregulation of international markets and the gradual abolition of 
protectionism since the mid-1980s which led to imports being gradually increased. The 
second event is the introduction of research, development and innovation in the Greek food 
industry through different Developmental Laws and Operational Programmes towards the 
1990s which resulted in the increase in the competitiveness of some problematic and small-
scale firms in the Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry. However, the degree of 
market power in the Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry slightly increased 
during the period 2001–2003, i.e. the sub-period t=7, probably due to the launch of the euro 
in 2000. The launch of the euro led some small-scale firms to exit the Greek food market 
since they could not operate in the Single European Market and the European Monetary 
Union.  
The empirical findings of the demand equation imply that first, the price elasticity of 
output demand () -0.6627 h =  is statistically significant at any conventional level of 
significance; second, the income demand elasticity of sector 159 ( ) 159 0.3350 z = , i.e. the 
manufacture of beverages, is statistically significant, and third the change in the income 
demand elasticity of each one of the sectors of the food and beverages manufacturing 
industry,  s z () 151,...,158 s = , with respect to sector 159, i.e. the manufacture of beverages, is 
statistically significant at any conventional level of significance. Furthermore, the results 
regarding scale economies imply the presence of increasing returns to scale. Finally, the 
Harberger loss is ranged between 2.71% for the sub-period t=8, i.e. the years 2004–2007, 
which equals €338.53 million in terms of value added and 3.40% for the sub-period t=1, i.e. 
the years 1983–1985, which is equal to €27.60 million in terms of value added whereas the 
Tullock loss is ranged between 5.29% for the sub-period t=8, i.e. the years 2004–2007, which 
is equal to €660.82 million in terms of value added and 6.34% for the sub–period t=1, i.e. the 
years 1983–1985, which is equal to €51.47 million in terms of value added (Table 3).  
 
5. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper has been to measure the degree of market power in the Greek 
food and beverages manufacturing industry over the period 1983–2007. For this purpose, 
three different approaches of the Bresnahan’s conjectural variation method are used. The first 
approach assesses the degree of market power of the whole Greek food and beverages 
manufacturing industry over the period 1983–2007. The second approach tests the degree of 
market power in each one of the nine sectors of the industry over the period under 
consideration, i.e. 1983–2007, and the third one estimates the extent of market power for the 
whole Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry for specific sub-periods of the 
period 1983–2007.  
The empirical results of the first approach imply the presence of imperfect competition 
in the whole Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry for the period 1983–2007. The   10
empirical findings of the second approach suggest the presence of a non-competitive market 
structure in each one of the nine sectors of the Greek food and beverages manufacturing 
industry for the period 1983–2007, with only sector 157, i.e. the manufacture of prepared 
animal feeds, showing a different degree of market power from all other sectors of the 
industry, i.e. sectors 151–156 & 157–158. Finally, according to the empirical findings of the 
third approach, each sub-period of the period 1983–2007, i.e. the sub-period t=1,…,8, appears 
to operate in conditions of imperfect competition in the whole Greek food and beverages 
manufacturing industry, with the sub-period t=1, i.e. the years 1983–1985, showing the 
highest degree of market power whereas the sub-period t=8, i.e. the years 2004–2007, the 
lowest degree of market power. 
  Two important events took place which resulted in the gradual decrease of the degree of 
market power in the Greek food industry during the period 1983–2007 except that for the 
period 2001–2003. The first is the deregulation of international markets and the gradual 
abolition of protectionism since the mid-1980s and the second is the introduction of research, 
development and innovation in the Greek food market through different Developmental Laws 
and Operational Programmes towards the 1990s. However, the degree of market power in the 
Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry was slightly increased during the period 
2001–2003 probably due to the launch of the euro in 2000.  
Furthermore, the present study estimates the net welfare loss (deadweight loss or 
Harberger loss) and the reduction of consumers’ welfare due to the transfer of income from 
consumers to the monopolist (Tullock loss) in the case of imperfect competition. According to 
the first approach, the empirical results indicate that, for the whole Greek food and beverages 
manufacturing industry, the Harberger loss is about 2.74% whereas the Tullock loss is about 
5.01%. The findings, regarding the second approach, imply that the Harberger and the 
Tullock losses are 2.43% and 4.25% respectively for sector 157 whereas for all other sectors 
of the food and beverages manufacturing industry, the Harberger and the Tullock losses are 
2.52% and 4.37% respectively. Finally, the empirical results of the third approach reveal that 
the Harberger loss is ranged between 2.71% for the sub-period 2004–2007 and 3.40% for the 
sub-period 1983–1985 while the Tullock loss is between 5.29% for the sub-period 2004–2007 
and 6.34% for the sub-period 1983–1985. 
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Table 1. Classification of sectors 
SIC Sector  description 
151  Production, processing and preserving of meat and meat products 
152  Processing and preserving of fish and fish products 
153  Processing and preserving of fruits and vegetables 
154  Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats 
155  Manufacture of dairy products 
156  Manufacture of grain milk products, starches and starch products 
157  Manufacture of prepared animal feeds 
158  Manufacture of other food products 
159  Manufacture of beverages 
 
Table 2. Empirical results of the conjectural variation model of Greek food and 
beverages manufacturing industry over the period 1983-2007 
  First Approach  Second Approach  Third Approach 
Coef. Estimated  System: 
Equations (9), (10), 
 (11), (13) 
First Estimated System:  
Equations (9), (10), (11), 
(14) 
Second Estimated System:  
Equations (9), (10), 
(11), (15) 
Estimated System: 
Equations (9), (10), 
 (11), (16) 





***  (347.57) 
ay     0.6812
***(22.505) 0.6588
***(15.071) 0.6791
***  (22.513)  0.4287
***  (5.898) 
ayy  0.1030
***(8.720) 0.0284  (0.525)  0.0905
***  (7.174)  0.1041




***  (12.565)  0.0450




***  (50.960)  0.7817
***  (52.457) 
ak
α  0.2222
***(14.585)       0.2294
***(14.430)       0.2218
***  (14.527)       0.2183




***  (16.181)  0.0755





***  (-16.181)  -0.0755





***  (-12.565)  -0.0450




***  (-7.737)  -0.0098




***  (2.975)  0.0233




***  (-4.642)  -0.0066
***  (-6.304) 
Supply 
f15  0.7104 
***(3.106)  ─  ─  ─ 
f16  ─  ─ 0.7714
*** (3.440)  ─ 
f151  ─ -0.0005  (-1.474)  ─  ─ 
f152  ─ -0.0007  (-1.265)  ─  ─ 
f153  ─ -0.0002  (-0.584)  ─  ─ 
f154  ─ -0.0002  (-0.699)  ─  ─ 
f155  ─ -0.0001  (-0.606)  ─  ─ 
f156  ─ -0.0003  (-1.037)  ─  ─ 
f157  ─ -0.0008
*(-1.693) -0.0004
** (2.130)  ─ 
f158  ─ -0.0001  (-0.997)  ─  ─ 
f159  ─ 0.6760
*** (3.158)  ─  ─ 
f1  ─  ─  ─ 0.6612
***  (2.830) 
f2  ─  ─  ─ -0.0003
*  (-1.884) 
f3  ─  ─  ─ -0.0007
**  (-2.444) 
f4  ─  ─  ─ -0.0009
**  (-2.415)   12
f5  ─  ─  ─ -0.0012
**  (-2.421) 
f6  ─  ─  ─ -0.0014
**  (-2.391) 
f7  ─  ─  ─ -0.0012
**  (-2.216) 
f8  ─  ─  ─ -0.0016





***  (8.133)  19.9770




***  (-3.440)  -0.6627




***  (-14.603)  -0.1717




***  (-24.368)  -0.2878




***  (-8.098)  -0.0839




***  (-18.432)  -0.2196




***  (-6.774)  -0.0770




***  (-13.624)  -0.1529




***  (-19.820)  -0.2282




***  (-3.386)  -0.0366




*  (1.881)  0.3350








***(12.463)      
 
0.2876
***(8.687)      
 
0.2583
***  (12.582)      
 
0.2583
***  (12.582)      
a ak=1-al, gkl = -gll,  gky = -gly. The corresponding values in parentheses are “t-ratios” obtained by applying the Wald test 
statistic, 
b () () () , 1l n l n 1 * 1 3 tk t Y SCE C W Y a xty =−∂ ∂ =− +  at the point of approximation. The corresponding values 
in parentheses are “t-ratios” obtained by applying the Wald test statistic. 
*** indicates 1% significance levels, 
** indicates 5% significance levels, 
* indicates 10% significance levels.      
 
Table 3. Estimated Harberger and Tullock losses in the Greek food and beverages 


























































157 2.43  4.25  1153.29  60.59  1.47  2.58  ─  ─ 
1983-1985 3.40  6.34  811.86  ─  ─  ─ 27.60  51.47 
1986-1988 3.22  6.07  1416.70 ─  ─  ─ 45.62  85.99 
1989-1991 3.00  5.73  2535.86 ─  ─  ─ 76.08  145.31 
1992-1994 2.93  5.63  4624.16 ─  ─  ─ 135.49  260.34 
1995-1997 2.84  5.49  5451.29 ─  ─  ─ 154.82  299.28 
1998-2000 2.78  5.39  6733.66 ─  ─  ─ 187.2  362.94 
2001-2003 2.83  5.48  8176.80 ─  ─  ─ 231.4  448.09 
Third 
Approach 
2004-2007 2.71  5.29  12491.87  ─  ─  ─ 338.53  660.82 
a The estimated Harberger and Tullock losses are ratios, 
b The value added is in million Euros, 
c The Harberger and Tullock 
losses are in terms of 2007 value added and in million Euros, 
d The Harberger and Tullock losses are in terms of value added 
and in million Euros. 
Figure 1. Degree of market power for the whole Greek food and beverages manufacturing 
industry for specific sub-periods of the period 1983-2007  
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